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 2 
Introduction 
 The debate over Church-and-State relations in the United States is full of 
conflicting interpretations.  In 1947, with the 5-4 ruling of Everson v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court linked the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
with the enforcement powers the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the federal 
government.1
The Everson case was part of a larger pattern of Constitutional incorporation in 
mid-20th century.  The Court did not dispute the extension of the Establishment Clause to 
include all governments of the United States through the enforcement power of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court’s authority to incorporate different parts of 
the Constitution for the betterment of the public welfare also was not disputed.  At issue, 
in this particular case, and in the whole Church-State issue, was the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause as part of the First Amendment.  The Everson 
decision was a landmark case.  An analysis of the pressures that led to this decision is 
critical to a true understanding of the Church-State issue.  An analysis of these pressures 
will give evidence of the events surrounding the decision and help to create the historical 
context under which this decision was made, which will clarify the meaning of the role 
that this decision has played in Church and State issues. 
  This linkage extended the power of the Establishment Clause to include 
local and state governments. This case, therefore, restructured subsequent debate about 
the separation of Church-and-State.   
In the Everson case, the Court reaffirmed that the First Amendment provided for a 
clear and distinct separation between the powers of Church and State.  The Court was 
                                               
1 Maureen Harrison and Steve Gilbert, eds. Freedom of Religion Decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court.  (San Diego: Excellent Books: 1996), i  
 3 
comprised of seven appointees from the Roosevelt administration, and two new 
appointees by President Truman.2
Two main schools of historical thought emerged after 1947, as legal historians 
explored the Establishment Clause and the effect of Everson.  The non-preferentialist 
school advanced a narrow view of the Establishment Clause as merely prohibiting one 
faith from receiving preferential treatment from the government.
  Despite the agreement that the First Amendment 
clearly separated the Church and State, the Court was split on the extent of this separation 
and what exceptions to this separation existed, if any. 
3  The strict-separationist 
school viewed the Establishment Clause in a broader sense.  They saw the Establishment 
Clause as clearly establishing absolute separation between Church and State.4
These two schools of thought built on the premise of original intent.  Authors in 
each school found documents written by the writers of the Bill of Rights to try and prove 
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause.  Due to the diversity of sources, and 
disparate opinions of the "the Founders," authors in each school found evidence to 
support their interpretations of the Establishment Clause in these "original" sources.  This 
traditional debate, however, ignores the larger issue of why this landmark case emerged 
in 1947 and why it was so influential then and later.  They both ignored political 
pressures that encouraged the Court to consider this case, including such things as the 
 
                                               
2 The Justices presiding over the 1947 Everson case, and the date which they were appointed: 
Chief Justice: Fred Vinson, June 24, 1946.  Associate Justices: Hugo Black, August 19, 1937, Stanley 
Reed, January 31, 1938, Felix Frankfurter, January 30, 1939, William Douglas. April 17, 1939, Frank 
Murphy, February 5, 1940, Robert Jackson, July 11, 1941, Wiley Rutledge, February 15, 1943, and Harold 
Burton October 1, 1945.  With the exceptions of Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton the Court was 
entirely appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt.  Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton were 
appointed by Truman.  www.supremecourtus.gov accessed 5/25/03 
3Robert L. Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (New 
York:Lambeth Press, 1982) 
4 Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co: 1986) 
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continual struggle for power between the branches of government, as well as the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, including the religious clauses, through the power of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.5
A more promising line of inquiry for understanding the significance of the 
Everson decision builds from the historical context in which this case was decided.  Legal 
historians cannot resolve the question of original intent.  Historians can, however, restore 
the context in which the Court acted in 1947.  This paper examines the social and 
political pressures at work in the late 1940s, when the Supreme Court heard and decided 
the Everson case, and it addresses an area previous historians largely avoided in their 
analysis of this case.  To understand what the Supreme Court did in its 1947 Everson 
decision, it is imperative to understand the “why” behind the decision.  Political tensions 
between the Executive and Judicial branches of government, as well as internal tensions 
on the Court, helped propel the Everson case and related Church-State issues onto the 
Court’s docket at that particular juncture in time.  The Court addressed these issues at an 
important time in the nation’s history, in the beginning of the Cold War, during the reign 
of McCarthyism.  This context makes it imperative to consider the case in relation to its 
in time if we hope to truly understand the case. 
    
 
 
The Everson Case 
                                               
5 The two schools of historical thought surrounding the Church-State issue are addressed later in 
the section entitled The Two Schools of Thought.  Two main sources of this Church-State debate are 
Robert L. Cord, whose book, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction, outlines 
the view of non-preferentialists, while the book The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First 
Amendment by Leonard W. Levy outlines the opposing view arguing for a broader interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.  
 5 
 The court case Everson v. Board of Education stemmed from a New Jersey state 
law.  The law required School Boards to use tax revenues to reimburse parents for the 
cost parents incurred using public transportation for transporting their children to and 
from school.  This law applied to the parents of students who attended public schools, as 
well as those who attended parochial schools.  The Board of Education for the Township 
of Ewing authorized a total of $8,034 to compensate parents for the cost of their 
children’s transportation to school, of which $357.74 was paid to the parents of parochial 
school children.6
Arch Everson, a taxpayer of Ewing Township (near Trenton) denied, on 
Constitutional grounds, the right of the Board of Education to reimburse the parents of 
Catholic school children for the costs of transportation.  The grounds under which 
Everson filed suit were that the taxes being paid to individuals violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He also argued that the law violated the First 
Amendment in its provision prohibiting any “law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”
   
7  The New Jersey State Court supported Everson’s contention,  ruling that the 
State law was in violation of the Constitution.  The New Jersey Court of Errors and 
Appeals reversed the lower court, stating that the law was in fact constitutional and did 
not violate the Establishment Clause.  The Federal Supreme Court confirmed this reversal 
in its February 11, 1947 ruling Everson v. Board of Education.8
The Federal Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the New Jersey statute did not violate 
the Constitution.  Beyond that narrow finding, however, the majority of the Court 
  
                                               
6 Wood, Lewis, “High Court Backs State Right to Run Parochial Buses.”  New York Times.  
February 11, 1947.  pg. 31  
7 Everson v. v. Board of Education for the Township of Ewing.  330 U.S. 1, 5-18 
8 Wood, 31  
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affirmed that the Establishment Clause did indeed erect a barrier between the Church and 
the State that should not be violated.  The Court ruled, however, that in this instance, the 
New Jersey law did not violate that separation.  Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority 
opinion.  Black argued that the Establishment Clause meant more than the traditional 
view that the government could not establish an official church.  He argued that members 
of any faith cannot be excluded from enjoying the common benefits of public society no 
matter what their religion.  According to the Court, to limit the reimbursement by the 
School Board to only those parents whose children attended public schools would be, in 
essence, a true violation of the Establishment Clause.  If the State imposed such limits, 
Black argued, it would breach the wall of separation imposing prejudicial restraint on a 
member of a certain faith.9
Justice Wiley Rutledge wrote a dissenting opinion that the entire minority 
supported.  His opinion stressed the minority’s view that they were in agreement with the 
majority in recognizing a clear and high wall separating Church and State, but they 
believed that the actions of the New Jersey law clearly and definitively violated the 
Establishment Clause.  Black's majority opinion, however, argued, “the First Amendment 
has erected a wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and 
impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it 
here.”
   
10
Justice Black quoted one of the nation’s founding fathers, citing Thomas 
Jefferson’s famous phrase “a wall of separation between Church and State.”
 
11
                                               
9 Everson 16  
  Though 
10 Ibid, 18  
11 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to the Danbury Association,” January 1, 1802; from Andrew 
Lipscomb and Albert Bergh’s, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Vol. 16. 
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the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, ruling that the law was indeed 
constitutional, it also reconfirmed that a distinct wall separated the two great powers of 
Church and State.  This concept established Everson as the foundation for future Supreme 
Court interpretations of the Establishment Clause. 
 
 
The Debate Over Church and State 
The First Amendment of the Constitution included two components of religious 
freedom: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.  The Establishment 
Clause states simply, “congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”12  Historians continue to debate whether or not the Supreme Court, in its 
Everson decision, contradicted the original intent of those who initially drafted the 
Establishment Clause as one component of the First Amendment.13
The debate over the relationship between Church and State has a deep-rooted 
history.  Between 1787, when the Constitution was penned, and 1789, when the First 
Congress sent the first twelve amendments to the states for ratification, the framers were 
involved in a contentious debate over the proper relationship between government and 
religion.  Those involved in the ratification process were fearful that a government-
backed religion might secure the power to persecute those who did not subscribe to their 
particular doctrine.
   
14
                                               
12 Federal Constitution, First Amendment  
  Individuals involved in the creation of the new government and of 
the First Amendment, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, hoped to separate 
13 For further discussion concerning this battle, see later section on the historiographic debate 
entitled, The Two Schools of Thought.  
14 Everson v. Board of Education, 9-10  
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these powers, thereby preventing the conglomeration of power found in England and 
many of the thirteen colonies.   
The debate over Church and State did not end with the inclusion of the 
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment.  The debate continued in the form of a 
dispute over what the founders intended by the Establishment Clause, and in the present 
circumstances, whether or not the Supreme Court, in the 1947 Everson case, adhered to 
the original intent of the First Amendment in its interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause.   
This pre-occupation with original intent has blinded many historians to a deeper 
significance of the Everson case, and it has also prevented scholars from considering this 
case from within its own historical context.  The pointed fight between two opposing 
sides has diverted attention from why the Everson decision was itself originally written.  
In their pre-occupation with the original intent of the Founders, historians have neglected 
the original intent of the 1947 Court, which was concerned with political and social 
pressures such as the doctrine of selective incorporation, as well as factionalism within 
the Court, that led to the Everson decision. 
 
 
The Two Schools of Historical Thought 
In the debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause, the non-
preferentialist school narrowly construes the meaning of the Establishment Clause.  
Subscribers to this approach argue that the authors of the Establishment Clause intended 
only to prevent the government from bestowing preferential treatment upon one 
particular church or religious sect, and no more.  The non-preferentialists, such as Robert 
 9 
Cord and John Coughlin, argue that any further application of the Establishment Clause is 
a gross exaggeration of the original intent.15  Scholars of the strict-separationist school of 
thought hold a broader view, arguing that the Establishment Clause created a barrier 
between religion and government that could not be penetrated by any relationship 
between these two groups.  This latter group argues that the Everson case finally put into 
correct perspective the original intentions of the writers of the First Amendment.  This 
argument appears in the writings of Leonard Levy, Frank Swancara, and Leo Pfeffer.16
 One non-preferentialist of note is Historian Robert L. Cord, who has argued that 
the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent preferential treatment among religions 
and that historical evidence supports the view that the Everson decision took the 
Establishment Clause out of context.
 
17
 Cord's work relied on the remote past, presenting evidence that refuted the 1947 
ruling by the Supreme Court.  The book did not address the political and social pressures 
involved in the Supreme Court ruling of 1947. The historical evidence of letters and 
records written during the Constitutional debates informed Cord's conclusions about the 
intentions of the writers.  Cord used evidence from the first American Presidents, those 
  In Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact 
and Current Fiction, Cord argued that the interpretation of the Establishment Clause by 
the Supreme Court in 1947 directly contradicted the intentions of the writers of the First 
Amendment.  Cord argued that the “high and impregnable wall” described by Justice 
Hugo Black in the Court’s opinion in Everson, had no grounding in the original intent, 
and that it contradicted the true objectives of the Establishment Clause.   
                                               
15 Cord, 5  
16 Frank Swancara.  The Separation of Religion and Government: The First Amendment, 
Madison’s Intent, and the McCollum Decision: A Study of Separationism in America. (New York: Truth 
Seeker Company: 1950), 1  
17Cord   
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that helped to write the amendments as well as those who served in office shortly after 
the amendments were made, in their management of religious issues.  Cord argued that 
the actions and interpretations of Presidents such as George Washington, John Adams 
and James Madison do not match the later interpretations of the 1947 Court.18  Their 
actions, Cord concluded, clearly indicated that the Establishment Clause was not intended 
to abolish all connection between religion and government, but merely to prevent the 
Federal Government from bestowing preferential treatment on one particular religion.  
Cord noted that Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John 
Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Martin Van Buren all “established” religious 
schools in the form of subsidizing missionary work among Native tribes.19
 Cord, however, accorded these Presidents an authority not granted in the 
Constitution:  why do the interpretations of the Presidents hold more legitimacy than 
Supreme Court decisions?  On occasion, the actions of Presidents have been ruled 
unconstitutional by the Federal Supreme Court.  Cord used the actions of these Presidents 
as evidence of what their views of the Establishment Clause were, and what their goal 
was in the First Amendment.  The Court considers only its own precedent, not the actives 
of past Presidents, in its decisions.  Whether correct or misguided, the actions of these 
Presidents therefore are completely irrelevant to the deliberations of the Court. 
 
 Cord used the example of the Presidents as well as the literature associated with 
the amendment-writing processes to conclude that the Everson decision veered sharply 
from the intentions of the First Amendment.  By looking at how these individuals viewed 
their own amendment and their subsequent actions, Cord argued that one can understand 
                                               
18 Cord, 52-53  
19 Ibid, 59. (For a comprehensive review of the connections between early Presidents and the 
establishment of religious schools, see Chapter 3, Revelations.) 
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what they thought when they wrote it, thereby clearly establishing the goals of the 
Establishment Clause.20  According to Cord, the prohibitions of the Establishment 
Clause, according to Black's majority opinion, were complete fiction and in direct 
contradiction to the true meaning and intention of the First Amendment as illustrated by 
the historical evidence provided by primary historical documents, such as letters written 
by the Framers of the Constitution as well as those involved in the ratification process, 
and the recorded events of American history.21
 Cord argued his non-preferential interpretations of the Establishment Clause in 
1982.  Nine years later, another non-preferentialist, John J. Coughlin, argued that the 
Supreme Court erred in its broad, sweeping interpretation of the Establishment Clause.  
Coughlin argued that to correctly adhere to the original Constitution, the Supreme Court 
and historians need to look back to the "true" intentions of the framers and the 
implications of their frame of mind when they penned the First Amendment.
 
22
Coughlin's work, like Cord’s, focused entirely on the intentions of the authors of 
the First Amendment.  He focused his rejection of the Everson decision partly on the 
relationship between society and religion in the late 18th century.  The influence of 
religion on many of the authors of the Bill of Rights, argued Coughlin, is undisputed.  It 
was an integral part of society and education, and those who penned the Establishment 
Clause accepted that fact; therefore, Coughlin argued, to consider any relationship 
  This 
search is a very lofty goal, given the many conflicting views of what the Establishment 
Clause meant, even among those who wrote it.   
                                               
20 Cord, xiv  
21 Ibid, 111.  
22 John J. Coughlin.  “Religion, Education and the First Amendment.”  America.  Volume 168, 
Issue 17.  May 15, 1993, pg. 12-16  
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between religion and government as prohibited by the First Amendment is a grievous 
error.23  According to Coughlin, “the Framers never intended the Constitution to defile 
the religious understanding of the human person that prevailed in U.S. education.”24
 In stark contrast to the analysis of original intent by Cord and Coughlin, strict-
separationist scholars such as historian Leonard Levy argued that the interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause by the Everson Court was true to the original intentions of the First 
Amendment.  Levy contended that the preponderance of historical evidence supports this 
broad, sweeping interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
  
Over the years, historians who embraced the views of non-preferentialism, among them 
Cord and Coughlin, argued that the Everson case, in its deviation from original intent, 
had this exact, heinous effect. 
25  Levy wrote The 
Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment, in 1986, four years after Cord 
published Separation of Church and State.   Among historians of Constitutional Law 
there was an internal battle over the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, and Levy 
named Cord as his target.  Levy lambasted non-preferentialists, among them Cord, who 
questioned the Court’s reasoning in the Everson interpretation.26
                                               
23 Ibid, 13  
  According to Levy, the 
Establishment Clause had always been interpreted in a manner according to the true 
intentions of the Founders of the First Amendment.  To him, the only important aspect of 
Everson was that it incorporated the First Amendment, through the power of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore expanded the protection of the “wall of 
24 Ibid  
25 Levy 
26 Ibid, xvii  
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separation” to include the governments of states and localities.27  On this point, Levy 
followed Cord's strategy of arguing from the foundation of original intent, but Levy 
paradoxically faulted the non-preferentialists for relying too heavily on the original intent 
of the authors of the Establishment Clause.  The Constitution, he argued, is not a 
document preserved completely in its original nature with an interpretation fixed for all 
eternity with no change in meaning.  It is a "living document" that changes over time, as 
evident in the amendments made to it, and by the judicial interpretations of the original 
wording.28
 The strict-separationist school originated long before Levy wrote in 1986.  In 
1950, three years after the Everson ruling, Frank Swancara wrote, The Separation of 
Religion and Government: The First Amendment, Madison’s Intent, and the McCollum 
Decision: A Study of Separationism in America.  According to the forward written by 
Godfrey Von Hoffe, the book's purpose was to defend separatism from an assault by 
those who wished to see the powers of the State and the Church fused.
  Despite his adamant refutation of the doctrine of original intent, Levy relied 
on that doctrine as much as the non-preferentialists. 
29
 Swancara's book clearly defended the position of strict-separation and the 
dissenting opinion written by Justice Rutledge for the Everson case.  To Swancara, 
Rutledge's view that the First Amendment erected a high wall that would be violated by 
any connection between the Church and the State accurately reflected past interpretations 
of the Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court.
 
30
                                               
27 Ibid, 149  
  With Swancara writing so soon 
after the ruling and within the context of McCarthyism, his view of public reaction is 
28 Ibid  
29 Swancara, iv  
30 Ibid, 1  
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important to this study.  According to Swancara, the average citizen was in agreement 
with the Supreme Court decisions that upheld a strict wall, and they endorsed this view of 
the Establishment Clause.31
Swancara also argued that the Court's purpose in Everson was merely to expand 
the freedoms of the Establishment Clause and extend its protections to the states as well 
as the federal government.  Because Everson, in essence, changed nothing on the national 
level, Swancara argued it was not in need of defending.  This is important to the analysis 
of this historiographic debate: shortly after Everson, legal scholars argued that the 
Everson case changed only the incorporation of the freedoms defined under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Though Swancara brought original intent into his argument, it 
was not the crux of his defense.  His primary focus was that a defense of Everson and 
McCollum(1948)
 
32
 Two years after Swancara’s insistence that strict-separation was the true meaning 
of the Establishment Clause, Leo Pfeffer published Church State and Freedom.
 was unwarranted, because the actions of the Court were in agreement 
with their previously held view of the Establishment Clause, and that Everson merely 
expanded the powers of that clause to the states. 
33  Pfeffer 
looked at the broader issue of Church-and-State separation.  He looked at how other 
countries had dealt with the issue as well as the history of the issue, within the United 
States.34
                                               
31 Ibid, 18  
  He then examined the actual religious clauses of the First Amendment.  He 
considered original intent, not in light of Everson, but on a broader scale.  According to 
32 McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 203.(1948)  This 1948 decision about religious 
instruction upheld the Everson view of a high impregnable wall of separation between Church and State.  
33 Leo Pfeffer.  Church State and Freedom, (Boston: Beacon Press: 1953)  
34 Ibid, vii 
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Pfeffer, “in the minds of the fathers of our Constitution, independence of religion and 
government was the alpha and omega of democracy and freedom.”35
 Pfeffer followed Swancara's argument that the true issue and impact of Everson 
was that it incorporated the Establishment Clause with the enforcement power of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  He also stressed that the decision reaffirmed the Court's view 
that the First Amendment “prohibited the government from making laws that aid all 
religions as much as laws that aid one religion.”
 
36
Later Supreme Court decisions also help clarify the significance of Everson and 
the context in which it evolved into a landmark case after 1947.  Through the decades of 
the 50s and 60s, majority opinions frequently cited the Everson case, as did dissenting 
opinions.  In these opinions, the Court maintained that Everson merely defined the 
separation already present between the Church and the State, and they often sought to 
expand that definition.  In the 1952 Supreme Court decision, Zorach v. Clauson, Justice 
Douglas acknowledged Everson in the majority opinion and wrote,  
  In this analysis, Pfeffer grasped the 
crux of the matter.  Pfeffer and Swancara, writing shortly after the Everson decision, 
seemed clear on the meaning and power of the Establishment Clause, and the Everson 
decision.  Historians in the 1980s, however, returned to original intent and lost sight of 
these earlier arguments. 
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the 
philosophy that Church and State should be separated.  And so far as interference 
with the ‘free exercise’ of religion and an ‘establishment’ or religion are 
concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal.37
 
  
                                               
35 Ibid, 127  
36 Ibid, 564  
37 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312  
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Beyond the majority opinion in Zorach, the dissenting opinion by Justice Black, 
with Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurring, also fully recognized the effect 
and power of Everson.  Justice Black wrote, “I mean also to reaffirm my faith in 
the fundamental philosophy expressed in McCollum and Everson.”38
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissenting opinion in the 1958 Supreme 
Court decision Beilan v. Board of Public Education, in which he recognized that 
Everson established freedom of religion as a clearly guaranteed liberty.
  The general 
philosophy of Everson was their agreed standard for defining separation of 
Church and State.   
39  In this 
manner, Warren substantiated and affirmed the decision of the Court ten years 
before.  Four years later, in the 1962 decision of Engel v. Vitale, Justice Black 
wrote a majority opinion that linked the Everson view of the Establishment 
Clause with earlier arguments by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson affirming 
the clear prohibition of any connection between the Church and the State.40
 The view that Everson affirmed separation between Church and State 
dominated the Court opinions throughout the second half of the century.  Often, 
the Supreme Court seemed unsure of exactly how clearly the Everson case 
defined that separation.  In the 1971 decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme 
Court laid the groundwork for the separation identified in Everson.
 
41
                                               
38 Ibid, 317-318  
  Chief 
Justice Warren Earl Burger wrote in that 1971 opinion, “Candor compels 
acknowledgement, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of 
39 Beilan v. Board of Public Education, School District of Pennsylvania.  357 U.S. 399, 412  
40 Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421, 428 
41 Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602  
 17 
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.”42
 Though the Justices that made up the Court changed through the years, the 
Court continued to support the Everson decision.  The Court recognized Everson 
as the landmark case that defined the separation between Church and State 
through the 1970s.  In the per curiam decision of Buckley v. Valeo in 1975, the 
Court cited Everson, recognizing that, “the government may not aid one religion 
to the detriment of others or impose a burder on one religion that is not imposed 
on others, and may not even aid all religions.”
  With 
this in mind the Court expanded Everson and created the Lemon test to measure 
whether or not relations between Church and State violated the First Amendment. 
43
 
  These later views by the Court, 
citing the Everson precedent, clarify the intentions of the 1947 decision.  The 
Supreme Court clearly recognized the wall of separation which prohibited 
interactions between Church and State, but later Courts continued to recognize the 
debate, unsure of how absolute that separation was.  These later Courts began to 
redefine and expand Everson. 
 
 
 
The Blinding Obsession with Original Intent 
Both non-preferentialists and strict-separationists view original intent as the 
primary measure of the 1947 Everson ruling.  However, to evaluate Everson only in the 
context of documents written around the time of the ratification of the Constitution 
                                               
42 Ibid, 612  
43 Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1, 92  
 18 
ignores the nature of the Supreme Court and the contemporary context of its decisions.  
Regardless of the original intent of the Framers, the Court acted in the context of 
contemporary concerns in 1947.  The authors of the Constitution recognized the 
important need for adaptation and therefore included a mechanism for amendments in the 
document itself.  The Court also acknowledged the animation of the Constitution in its 
doctrine of Judicial Review, beginning in 1803 with Marbury v. Madision.44
To fully grasp the issue of the relationship between Church and State in the latter 
part of the twentieth century, therefore, historians must step back from the narrow focus 
on original intent to consider the context of the decade of the 40s and the Supreme Court 
decision that transformed the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment as interpreted in the Supreme Court rulings since Everson. 
  With the 
doctrine of judicial review, the Court assumed a direct role in adapting the Constitution to 
contemporary circumstances. 
 
 
Politics of 1947 
The overall context of 1947, including the makeup of the Supreme Court, political 
changes that had recently occurred, the postwar economy, the social implications of 
liberalism, and the beginnings of the Cold War all influenced the 1947 Everson decision.  
The Second World War had ended less than two years before, and President Truman was 
still adjusting to the governing legacy FDR had left behind.  The Court that Truman’s 
administration faced was a remnant of Roosevelt’s Administration, complete with their 
internal bickering.  This vestige of Roosevelt’s legacy was a Court focused on selective 
incorporation and civil rights, important focuses of the Everson decision. 
                                               
 44 Marbury v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137 (1803) 
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During the Great Depression, the Roosevelt Administration reconstructed the 
American government and its Courts, dramatically shifting the relationship of the 
government within the great society.  The New Deal built on the premise that the state 
had a duty to encourage social and economic justice in the interest of the public, with an 
emphasis on promoting stability and harmony among conflicting interests.45  Young 
idealistic lawyers flocked to Washington to join the fight for this "new liberalism", and 
FDR found support in many areas.  This did not, however, include the Federal Courts, 
especially the Supreme Court.  FDR found great opposition within the Supreme Court.46
By 1936, the Supreme Court had struck down or significantly limited the power 
of the majority of New Deal legislation, rendering the New Deal utterly ineffective.
   
47  To 
counteract the power of the Supreme Court to limit New Deal programs, the Roosevelt 
Administration proposed a “judiciary reorganization bill”, which would have changed the 
makeup of the Supreme Court, increasing the number of justices on the Court.48
FDR's reorganization bill prompted the Court to move more in the direction of 
considering social issues, such as Everson, rather than the economic issues of Roosevelt's 
programs.  Constitutional historians refer to this shift as the Supreme Court revolution of 
  This 
“Court packing” bill never had much chance of being passed, but it had a great impact on 
the role of the Supreme Court in the following decades, in that it changed the direction 
and focus of the Supreme Court.  As the judicial and executive branches struggled for 
power, the Supreme Court turned its focus to civil liberties, while the Roosevelt 
administration focused on economic issues.  
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46 Ibid, 483  
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1937.49  The cases involved in this revolution began with the case of West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish, where the Court made it known that their focus would shift away from the 
constitutional question of economic regulation and focus instead on the protected 
guaranteed rights of individuals; those rights that were granted to all citizens through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.50
In the 1937 Supreme Court decision Palko v. Connecticut,
  This new focus on civil liberties was intended by the Court to 
shift the influence away from the Executive branch and to bring more power and control 
to the Supreme Court in their continuing struggle against the Roosevelt Administration.  
The Supreme Court thereafter avoided directly confronting FDR and began to focus on 
the issue of personal liberties, which had become increasingly more important since 
World War I.  The Supreme Court’s shift in this era is vital to an understanding of the 
Everson decision.  The Everson decision was merely the Court’s continuance of selective 
incorporation. 
51 Justice Benjamin 
Cardoza wrote for the Court saying that any fundamental right guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights was incorporated under the power of the Fourteenth Amendment to include the 
regulation of States, not just the Federal Government.  He defined a fundamental right as 
that which is essential to the maintenance of ‘ordered liberty.’52
The Supreme Court gained power in this era with the doctrine of selective 
incorporation.  According to historian Melvin Urofsky, the Constitution did not give 
definitive provisions in what should be applied to states.  The judges had to determine 
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what they viewed, and what legal historians viewed to be a fundamental right.53  With 
this new focus, the Supreme Court embarked on a quest, which continued into the era of 
the Vinson Court, for “total justice”: the protection of individual liberties.54
 
  It was this 
quest, not a misguided interpretation of the First Amendment that led directly to the 
Court’s decision in Everson. 
 
Selective Incorporation and Supreme Court Strife 
The Supreme Court's doctrine of “selective incorporation” began a new era of 
jurisprudence.  Some opponents of the Court viewed incorporation as an over extension 
of the Court’s role.  Conservatives of political and legal circles argued that the Court had 
usurped power that justly belonged to the States, and that it had turned itself into a 
legislating body, by which they exceeded their Constitutional authority.55  According to 
legal historian Kermit Hall, some law professors of the time saw the extension of civil 
liberty protection as the Supreme Court’s attempt to, “usurp legislative power, with 
distorting the meaning of federalism, and with substituting their values for the original 
intentions of the Framers.”56
Between the Supreme Court of 1937 and the Everson ruling one decade later, the 
makeup of the Court changed drastically.  By the time Roosevelt died in 1945, he had 
filled the vacancies of the Supreme Court with people sympathetic to his political 
philosophies.  He appointed an entirely new Supreme Court, with the solitary exception 
  Who were these men who some argued were undermining 
the very nature of the federalist system? 
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of Chief Justice Harlan Stone.  Stone had served on the Court since 1925, having been 
appointed by President Coolidge.57  Chief Justice Stone died on April 22, 1946.  This left 
President Truman in the unique position of having to appoint a Chief Justice to a Court 
made up almost exclusively of Roosevelt appointees. Truman was an inexperienced 
foreign diplomat, and though this is seemingly unrelated to the Supreme Court it had a 
great deal to with the political and social undercurrents of the decade.58  The uneasiness 
of Truman’s presidency had a great impact on the Court and the decisions it made.  He 
ultimately appointed Fred Vinson, a member of both Roosevelt’s and Truman’s cabinets, 
who presided over the Court that heard the Everson case.59
There was great internal strife on the Supreme Court in 1946.  This internal strife 
had a great influence on Truman’s appointment of Vinson, as well as the Court’s decision 
in Everson.  FDR had wanted to appoint Robert Jackson as Chief Justice following the 
death of Chief Justice Hughes, prior to World War Two. Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
however, convinced FDR to appoint a more conservative man than Justice Jackson, to 
serve as Chief Justice, given the impending war and their need for support.  FDR 
appointed Harlan Stone Chief Justice, and gave Stone’s seat as Associate Justice to 
Jackson.  FDR promised Jackson the Chief Justiceship at the retirement of Stone.   This 
was clearly a point on the mind of the Court when it came time for Truman to appoint the 
new Chief Justice.  However, FDR was dead, and Truman did not feel that Jackson could 
unite the splintered court. 
 
60
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The strife within the Court was a huge issue.  A reporter for the Washington Star 
reported the internal contentions of the Court on May 16th.  She reported that the Court 
had been fractured since Black and Jackson’s fight over Jewell Ridge.  She reported that 
if Truman appointed Jackson as Chief Justice, both Justices Black and Douglas would 
retire.61
Beyond the splintered Court, lingered the liberal legacy of Roosevelt.  The liberal 
tendencies of the justices continued long after FDR, and were replayed on the Vinson 
Court and, subsequently, in the 1947 ruling of Everson.  However, the question arises, if 
this court was so liberal, why did the decision uphold the New Jersey State Law requiring 
the reimbursement of bus fares paid by parents to get their children to parochial schools? 
  One month later, Truman named Fred Vinson as Chief Justice. 
There are several possible reasons for the Supreme Court’s decision to hear this 
case.  In 1946, when the Everson case was heard, the Supreme Court had already 
determined that its primary purpose was to incorporate federally guaranteed liberties to 
be applicable to local and State governments.  This movement of selective incorporation 
was intended to extend the Supreme Court’s power.  Given this context, it is apparent that 
it was not the issue of Church-and-State, but the incorporation of the guaranteed right 
against government-established religion.  This is a vital point that is sorely missing from 
most historical analyses of the Everson decision. 
 The Supreme Court, in 1947, followed the policies of selective incorporation and 
furthered the protection of individual rights while advancing the power of the Court itself.  
Justice Felix Frankfurter supported Cordozo’s position of incorporation, while Justice 
Hugo Black argued that the Fourteenth Amendment actually incorporated all of the Bill 
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of Rights.62  Justice Black and Douglas developed a view of jurisprudence that privatized 
First Amendment rights.  They argued extensively for an “absolutist” interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights protections, saying that the Bill of Rights barred all government 
interference.63
These were the issues dividing the fractured Court that sat in judgment of the 
Everson case.  Agreement and solidarity were far from the minds of the justices as they 
considered the reach of the Establishment Clause; however, they all agreed there was a 
clearly defined barrier between the Church and the State.  The majority opinion stated, 
“The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the evils it was 
designed forever to suppress, have several times been elaborated by the decisions of this 
Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth.”
  These “absolutist” views extended to the First Amendment especially the 
Establishment Clause.   
64  
Rutledge argued a similar view in the minority dissenting opinion.  In the first paragraph 
of his dissenting opinion, Rutledge argued, “Neither so high nor so impregnable today as 
yesterday is the wall raised between church and state by Virginia’s great statute o 
religious freedom and the First Amendment, now made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth.”65
This internal conflict over what should be incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the issue that consumed the Court in the Everson case.  The Court did 
not debate the "original intent" of the Constitution's Establishment Clause.  The Justices 
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all agreed that the Clause erected what they termed, “a wall of separation between 
Church and State.”  The simply disagreed on whether this protection was incorporated by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and if it was protected, how intense was the protection, or 
“how high the wall”. 
 
 
Social Implications of Everson 
Public reactions to the Everson case are important because the decision actually 
enhanced the government’s ability to interfere with religion.  This view is contradictory 
to the usual explanation of Everson, which argues that the Supreme Court single-
handedly erected a large wall of separation.  The magazine U.S. News and World Reports 
wrote about the case ten days after the decision was handed down.66  The article argued 
that the case, as described by the majority’s opinion, maintained religious separation by 
providing that the government could not discriminate based upon a person’s faith.  The 
article then went through the background of Supreme Court decisions that set up the 
relationship between Church and State.67  According to the article, the decision blatantly 
supported the government's interaction with and interference in religious affairs, violating 
the Establishment Clause.68
Time Magazine reported a much different view of the Everson decision.  
According to this magazine, the Court was unable to solve anything in regard to the long-
standing issue of the Church-State issue.  The most interesting point in this magazine 
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article was the author's view that the Supreme Court was incapable of solving anything 
and had only proved that the issue of Church and State was far from resolved.  The article 
predicted correctly, that the issue would be before the people for a long time to come.69  
This report also discussed the impact that this decision had on states, recognizing the 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.70
 Though these articles show two varying representations of the social 
comprehension of the Church-State issue and the power of the Establishment Clause, 
they help to explain the future trouble with the interpretation.  These two different views, 
presented in two very prominent magazines, showed that there was no unifying view of 
the impact or power of the Everson decision.  These socially constructed views of the 
decision help to put this vital case into the proper contemporary context.   
 
 
Conclusion 
What is clear from any analysis of the Everson decision and the overall scope of 
the Establishment Clause, is that over the years this issue has been hotly debated.  What 
has been missing from the general analysis of the Everson case has been the 
contemporary issues surrounding the decision and influencing judicial priorities.  The 
Everson case cannot be looked at only in terms of the original intent of the framers of the 
First Amendment.   
What is more important than whether or not the Court’s decision in Everson 
adhered to the intentions of the First Amendment, is the fact that the Supreme Court did 
make a decision with Everson.  Why did they choose to make this decision?  Was it their 
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intention to forever change the meaning of the Establishment Clause?  The evidence, 
taken in context, suggests not.  The intentions of the Supreme Court are found in the 
historical context surrounding the actual decision. 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court packing bill of 1936 had a direct impact on 
the state of politics in 1947 and the role of the Supreme Court.  The Court changed its 
focus in 1937 to move away from their focus on Roosevelt’s economic issues, and to 
focus more on social issues and Civil Rights.  This Supreme Court Revolution of 1937 
led to the social and political conditions present in the Everson case. 
The Supreme Court had gained significant power as it began to interpret the 
extent of the Bill of Rights through the doctrine of selective incorporation.  This focus on 
incorporating fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment was a critical factor 
in the Court's decision to consider Everson in 1947.  The Court was only marginally 
interested in the meaning of the Establishment Clause.  The Court, however, wished to 
apply the Establishment Clause to the States, thereby extending the Court's power in the 
face of a Constitutional challenge from FDR and Truman.  They were merely continuing 
on the pattern of incorporation when they ruled as they did in Everson.  The majority 
opinion, as well as that of the dissenters, clearly indicates that the issue was incorporation 
and not the fundamental principle of the Church-State issue.  Later historians erroneously 
reached back to original intent in an effort to explain this case, but it was the political and 
social context of the decision that held the true meaning and influence of the Everson 
decision.  
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